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SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAM(U) FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON DC OFFICE OF CIVIL


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
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U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of The Civil Aviation Security Program

January 1 - June 30, 1983

A134860

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Washington, D.C. 20591

October 1983

Report of the Administrator
of the Federal Aviation Administration
to the United States Congress
pursuant to Section 315 (a)
of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958

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15. Supplementary Notes This report is required by Section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.			
16. Abstract This report provides details on the effectiveness of security screening of passengers and all property intended to be carried in the aircraft cabin in air transportation or intrastate air transportation. It also provides a statistical summary of aircraft hijackings and alleged violations of Federal Aviation regulations pertaining to security screening.			
17. Key Words		18. Distribution Statement Document is available to the public through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161	
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U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Office of the Administrator

800 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

OCT 21 1983

The Honorable George Bush
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

Forwarded herewith is the Federal Aviation Administration's Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program. The report covers the period January 1 to June 30, 1983, and is submitted in accordance with section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act.


The seven aircraft hijackings which occurred in the first half of 1983, four of which ended in Cuba, are more than in any half-year period since the second half of 1980. From May 1 through September 22, there were 13 U.S. aircraft hijacked. Eleven of these hijackings ended in Cuba. With the exception of the 13 hijackings to Cuba in 1980, the 11 during this 4 1/2-month period are more than in any year since 1970.

In eight of the hijackings since May 1, the hijackers boarded at an airport in the South Florida area, three boarded at San Juan, Puerto Rico, and two at New York, New York. To meet this upsurge, extraordinary security measures were instituted, additional air carrier personnel training programs were conducted and, where necessary, screening equipment was upgraded at the airports concerned. We believe these actions will be sufficient to counter this threat. We are prepared, however, to institute additional security measures should those now in place prove to be insufficient to meet the needs of the situation.

This report has been modified to focus on the specific information required by Section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act. This action is necessary to reduce the data reporting burden on the civil aviation security staff involved in resolving the hijacking emergency situation in South Florida. Given the resource commitment necessary to prepare civil aviation security reports on a semiannual basis, we are considering the feasibility and desirability of compiling such reports on an annual basis instead.

The enclosed report has also been sent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Sincerely,


Lynn Helms
Administrator

Enclosure



U.S. Department
of Transportation

Federal Aviation
Administration

OCT 21 1983

Office of the Administrator

800 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

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J. Lynn Helms
Administrator

Enclosure

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EXHIBITS

1. Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Scheduled Air Carrier Aircraft
2. Hijacking Attempts on U.S. and Foreign Aircraft
3. Hijacking Attempts on U.S. General Aviation Aircraft
4. Actual Hijackings and Prevented Hijacking Attempts
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I. EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS

1. THIS REPORT COVERS THE PERIOD JANUARY-JUNE 1983.
2. U.S. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS COVER OVER 245 U.S. AND FOREIGN AIRLINES OPERATING ABOUT 21,000 FLIGHTS DAILY FROM ABOUT 640 U.S. AND FOREIGN AIRPORTS.
3. OVER 313 MILLION PERSONS WERE PROCESSED THROUGH U.S. PASSENGER CHECKPOINTS. ABOUT 1,360 FIREARMS WERE DETECTED WITH OVER 630 RELATED ARRESTS.
4. WORLDWIDE, 17 HIJACKINGS OCCURRED (9 SUCCESSFUL) AGAINST SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS. SEVEN WERE AGAINST U.S. AIRLINES (5 SUCCESSFUL).
5. OF THE 10 FOREIGN AIR CARRIER HIJACKINGS, 7 OCCURRED ON DOMESTIC FLIGHTS.
6. THERE WERE NO U.S. GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT HIJACKED DURING THE PERIOD.
7. DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1983, ALLEGED SECURITY VIOLATIONS BY AIR CARRIERS, AIRPORTS, AND INDIVIDUALS TOTALED 1,669.
8. OF THE 1,669 ALLEGED SECURITY VIOLATIONS, 96 RESULTED IN CIVIL PENALTIES TOTALING \$27,395.

II. INTRODUCTION

This is the 18th Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program. It covers the period January 1 - June 30, 1983, and is submitted in accordance with section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act. This report has been abbreviated to present a concise picture of the national situation with regard to the effectiveness of the procedures utilized to screen airline passengers and their carryon items prior to their being allowed to board scheduled and public charter flights.

III. AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS

Since September 11, 1981, the effective date of Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 108, Airplane Operator Security, for the purpose of differentiating between air carrier and general aviation hijackings, all hijackings of certificate holder aircraft have been considered air carrier hijackings. FAR 108 defines "certificate holder" as a person holding a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operating certificate when that person engages in scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operations or both.

Seven U.S. air carrier hijackings occurred during the reporting period. Five were successful and four ended in Cuba. The seven air carrier hijackings in this 6-month period are more than in any 6-month period since the second half of 1980 and equals the total number of U.S. air carrier hijackings experienced in all of 1981. This apparent growing number of air carrier hijacking incidents, particularly the rising number of hijackings to Cuba, is a matter of serious concern. To correct this unacceptable trend, continuing efforts are being made throughout the system to ensure constant vigilance at passenger screening checkpoints and full compliance with all required security measures.

By way of comparison, during this same 6-month period, 10 foreign air carrier aircraft were hijacked. Four of these hijackings were successful and in seven cases the hijackings occurred aboard aircraft which were on scheduled domestic flights within the country of registry.

(See Exhibits 1 and 2)

No U.S. general aviation hijackings occurred during the reporting period. For purposes of reference, however, the overall record of U.S. general aviation hijackings has been included in this report.

(See Exhibit 3)

As a part of its review of civil aviation security incidents, the FAA identifies and records those incidents in which it appeared that individuals involved intended to hijack an aircraft or commit other crimes against civil aviation but were prevented from doing so by security measures in effect. During this reporting period, there were 1,363 firearms detected at security screening checkpoints under suspicious circumstances. Although sufficient data were not developed to fully support the determination, it is believed that in some of these instances the persons carrying the firearms may have intended to hijack an aircraft. While the number of incidents in which an aircraft hijacking or related criminal act against civil aviation was prevented cannot be positively determined, in two specific incidents during the first half of 1983, the circumstances tend to support that likelihood. This raises the estimated total number of hijackings or related crimes against civil aviation believed prevented since 1973 to 106.

(See Exhibits 4 and 7)

IV. BASIC POLICIES AND REGULATORY IMPACT

The basic policy guiding the development and implementation of U.S. procedures on aircraft passenger security screening is the sharing of principal responsibilities among airlines, airports, local communities, the Federal Government, and the passengers. This concept has produced a cooperative and effective program which has provided the capability of addressing and meeting current security needs as well as responding to the changing level and nature of threats against civil aviation. Airline and airport security measures continue to provide increased safety and protection to air travelers, aircraft crewmembers, air carrier aircraft, and air carrier servicing airports. These measures are based upon FAR and currently involve 245 U.S. and foreign airlines operating about 21,100 flights each day to or from U.S. and foreign airports. In carrying out these operations, approximately 1.844 million persons and about 1.808 million pieces of carryon articles were processed through the security screening system daily. In view of the perceived threat in the South Florida area highlighted by an increase in aircraft hijackings from airports in this area, in mid-June, air carriers were required to initiate certain extraordinary security measures for scheduled and public charter flights conducted from selected South Florida airports. These measures will continue to be required only as long as a high level of threat continues.

(See Exhibits 6 and 7)

V. PASSENGER SCREENING

The program of airline screening procedures which encompasses the inspection of passengers and their carryon items was fully implemented in January 1973. During the more than 10 years these screening systems have been in operation, there has been an overall dramatic decrease in the number of hijackings of U.S. air carrier aircraft. Since the initiation of these procedures, there have been 80 air carrier aircraft hijackings. This amounts to an average of between seven and eight per year and is about 35 percent of the average of 27 per year experienced in the 5 years immediately preceding the beginning of the program. The seven hijackings during this reporting period, of which four ended in Cuba,

represent a large increase and are very reminiscent of the surge of hijackings to Cuba which occurred in 1980.

The objective of passenger screening activities centers particularly on the detection of firearms and explosives or incendiary devices. These items are considered to present the greatest threat to civil aviation security. The FAA's analysis of screening checkpoint activity includes the recording and study of the number of firearms and explosive or incendiary devices detected and false threats received, as well as related information received concerning arrests of individuals involved. Results of U.S. screening activities for the first 6 months of 1983 are detailed below.

There were over 313.9 million persons processed through screening checkpoints at 375 airports during the first half of 1983. A total of 1,363 firearms were detected. X-ray inspection accounted for 1,283 (94 percent) of the firearms detected, 68 (5 percent) were detected by use of the metal detector, and 12 (1 percent) were detected as a result of physical search. The total firearms detected is 19 percent higher than the average of 1,139 firearms detected during the preceding eight reporting periods; however, it is slightly lower (2 percent) than the 1,390 firearms detected during the second half of 1982. In comparing the total persons screened and total weapons detected during this reporting period with the average number of persons screened (300.7 million) and the average number of weapons detected (1,139) for the preceding eight reporting periods, it was determined that persons screened increased a little more than 4 percent while the number of weapons detected increased 19 percent. This relatively small increase in persons screened and the larger increase in weapons detected has occurred with consistency for the past three reporting periods. During this reporting period, there were four military explosive/incendiary devices detected by X-ray inspection of carryon items.

There were 633 persons arrested at screening points for the carriage of firearms. This represents an increase of 59 (10 percent) over the average of 574 arrests for the preceding eight reporting periods and a reduction of 30 (5 percent) from the 663 which occurred during the last 6 months of 1982. The 633 arrests were made at screening points at 81 airports throughout the United States. Screening activities are analyzed within airport categories according to the number of persons screened per year as follows: Category I - 2 million or more, Category II - 500,000 to 2 million, and Categories III and IV - under 500,000. Passenger screening is conducted at Category IV airports only when deplanement at a sterile area at another airport is desired. Of the 633 arrests, 519 (82 percent) occurred at 41 Category I airports (e.g., Chicago, Illinois, and Denver, Colorado); 88 (14 percent) occurred at 22 Category II airports (e.g., Norfolk, Virginia, and Albuquerque, New Mexico); and the remaining 26 (4 percent) occurred at 18 Categories III and IV airports (e.g., Montgomery, Alabama, and Portland, Maine). Historically, well over 50 percent of the persons arrested for attempting to carry firearms through passenger screening systems have been fined, placed in confinement, or been subjected to other disciplinary action. In addition to criminal prosecution actions by Federal and local jurisdictions, the FAA may take civil action against

individuals who without proper authorization attempt to carry a firearm or explosive/incendiary device through screening checkpoints. During this reporting period, 1,460 investigations of individuals were completed and \$21,295 in civil penalties were collected.

The equipment primarily used to conduct screening operations consists of walk-through weapons detectors for the screening of passengers and, at high volume screening checkpoints, X-ray inspection systems for carryon articles. At most stations, hand-held metal detecting devices are used as backup support for the walk-through weapon detection devices. The FAA, in conjunction with the airline industry, has ongoing research and development projects geared toward the producing of new screening equipment which will improve detection capabilities and minimize passenger inconvenience.

(See Exhibits 7 and 8)

IV. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

The FAA is responsible for ensuring compliance by airlines, airports, and individuals with the various requirements affiliated with security screening levied through pertinent FAR. The basic purpose of these requirements is to assure safety and security for airline passengers and crewmembers. Alleged or apparent violations of regulatory requirements are investigated and appropriate administrative or legal actions taken.

Success in achieving compliance by all concerned is primarily dependent upon the degree of cooperation between industry personnel and the persons responsible for enforcement of the regulations. Airlines and airport operators generally take prompt corrective action on their own when a potential problem is recognized thus reducing the need for more extensive enforcement action.

In instances where an investigation of an alleged violation of the regulations indicates lack of compliance, administrative or legal action may be necessary. These actions take the form of Warnings, Letters of Correction, or assessment of civil penalties. During the first half of 1983, 1,669 investigations of alleged security violations by air carriers, foreign air carriers, airports, and individuals were completed. In 96 of the cases, civil penalties totaling \$27,395 were collected, and in 1,422 cases, administrative corrective action was taken. In the remaining cases, the alleged violations were not substantiated. The total number of investigations completed during this 6-month reporting period represents more than a 20 percent increase over the second half of 1982. This increase in total enforcement actions is due in a large part to the large number of persons apprehended with weapons at passenger screening checkpoints and the more than 24 percent increase in completed investigations of this type.

(See Exhibit 8)

VII. OUTLOOK

Over the past several years, there has been a continuing improvement in civil aviation security measures throughout the world. The number of hijacking

incidents reflected in this report, however, indicate that crimes against civil aviation will continue to occur at a high rate.

The security problems facing the U.S. and international civil aviation are not subject to easy solution. Although helpful, engineering and mechanical improvements generally do not provide a complete solution. The principal complicating factors involved in these problems are the human elements, such as, recognition that the people operating the systems are subject to human error and that criminals will attempt to penetrate the system.


In the matter of aircraft hijackings by Cuban refugees, it must be recognized that this activity is only one effect of a much broader problem, that is, the Federal solution to the entire Cuban refugee issue. Until the many complicated problems involved in this broad issue are properly resolved, it is expected that certain elements of the Cuban refugee population will continue to attempt to secure passage to Cuba by hijacking aircraft.

Finally, regardless of the preventative measures taken, it is anticipated that civil aviation because of the nature of its operations will remain a desirable and vulnerable target to mentally disturbed, criminal, and terrorist elements. Security measures in effect in the United States are believed to be capable of meeting the current threat. Additional measures are available, however, should the danger increase. All systems have sufficient flexibility to allow appropriate increase or decrease in security requirements as the level or nature of the threat changes.



U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Scheduled Air Carrier Aircraft ^{1/}



HIJACKING BY YEAR	1930- 1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	TOTALS
TOTAL	9	16	40	25	25	27	1	3	6	2	5	8	11	21	7	9	7	222
SUCCESSFUL	4	12	33	17	11	8	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	13	1	3	5	112
INCOMPLETE ^{2/}	1	1	1	4	8	14	1	1	1	0	3	4	5	3	0	1	1	49
UNSUCCESSFUL	4	3	6	4	6	5	0	2	5	1	2	4	2	5	6	5	1	61

^{1/}Effective September 1981—Includes all certificate holders as defined in Code of Federal Regulations Title 14 Part 108.

^{2/}Hijacking in which hijacker is apprehended/killed during hijacking or a result of "hot pursuit".

U.S. Aircarrier Hijacking Attempts Since Jan. 1, 1983

Date 1983	Airline-Fit/ Aircraft	Number Aboard	Hijacker's Boarding Point	Hijacker's Destination/ Objective	Date 1983	Airline-Fit/ Aircraft	Number Aboard	Hijacker's Boarding Point	Hijacker's Destination/ Objective
1/7	DL-177/B-727	30	Portland, ME	Las Vegas, NV	5/12	CL-236/DC-8	231	San Juan, PR	Cuba
1/20	NW-608/B-727	41	Seattle, WA	Afghanistan	5/19	EA-24/B-727	132	Miami, FL	Cuba
2/15	XO-252/DHC-7	20	Killeen, TX	Cuba	6/14	EA-414/A-300	95	Miami, FL	Cuba
5/1	CL-236/DC-8	212	San Juan, PR	Cuba					


EXHIBIT 1

As of: 7/1/83



U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

Hijacking Attempts on U.S. And Foreign Aircraft*



*Includes General Aviation


EXHIBIT 2

As of: 7/1/83



U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

Hijacking Attempts on U.S. General Aviation Aircraft



✓Hijacking in which hijacker is apprehended/killed during hijacking or as a result of "hot pursuit."


EXHIBIT 3

As of: 7/1/83



U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

Actual Hijackings & Prevented Hijacking Attempts — 1974 to Present (U.S. Air Carrier Aircraft)



PREVENTED ATTEMPTS: Incidents in which it appeared the individuals involved intended to hijack an aircraft but were prevented from doing so by security procedures.

EXHIBIT 4

As of: 7/1/83



U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

Civil Aviation Security Basic Policies

<u>PROGRAM ELEMENT</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>	<u>ACTIONS</u>
AIR CARRIERS	SECURE TRAVEL	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS• SCREEN PASSENGERS, CARRY-ON ITEMS• SECURE BAGGAGE, CARGO PROCEDURES• PROTECT AIRCRAFT
AIRPORTS	SECURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS• PROTECT AIR OPERATIONS AREA• PROVIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT
FAA	LEADERSHIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• IDENTIFY AND ANALYZE THREAT• PRESCRIBE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS• COORDINATE SECURITY OPERATIONS• PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE• ENFORCE REGULATIONS
USERS	PROGRAM COSTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• SECURITY FUNDED AS OPERATING COST OF SYSTEM



U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

Civil Aviation Security Regulatory Impact

	<u>U.S.^{1/}</u>	<u>FOREIGN^{2/}</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Carriers	157	88	245
Airports	375	265	640
Aircraft	3,500	1,100	4,600
Flights Per Day	20,500	600	21,100
Screening Activity Per Day:			
Persons	1,734,000	110,000	1,844,000
Carry-On Items	1,708,000	100,000	1,806,000

^{1/} Effective September 1981 — includes all certificate holders as defined in Code of Federal Regulations Title 14, Part 108. The data is subject to fluctuations throughout the reporting period.

^{2/} Estimated — accurate source documents not available.

EXHIBIT 6

As of: 7/1/83



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Civil Aviation Security Airline Passenger Screening Results January 1979-June 1983

	1979 Jan-June	1979 July-Dec	1980 Jan-June	1980 July-Dec	1981 Jan-June	1981 July-Dec	1982 Jan-June	1982 July-Dec	1983 Jan-June
Persons Screened (Millions)	285.7	306.8	289.9	295.1	294.4	304.1	319.5	310.7	313.9
Weapons Detected									
Firearms	990	1171	1002	1020	971	1284	1286	1390	1363
(1) Handguns	902	1060	940	938	915	1209	1243	1316	1303
(2) Long Guns	29	26	17	19	7	37	16	41	22
(3) Other	59	85	45	63	49	38	27	33	38
Explosive/Incendiary Devices	3	0	1	7	8	3	0	1	4
Persons Arrested									
For Carriage of Firearms/ Explosives	469	591	520	511	534	653	651	663	633
For Giving False Information	21	26	11	21	34	15	21	6	7

Source: Reports of Passenger Screening Activities at U.S. Airports

EXHIBIT 7

As of: 7/1/83



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Civil Aviation Security Compliance and Enforcement Actions

	1973 through 1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
U.S. AIR CARRIERS								
Warnings	599	276	266	283	154	465	164	94
Letters of Correction	514	109	145	102	100	52	98	31
Non Enforcement Actions	273	61	65	49	55	38	44	29
Civil Penalties (Amount)	241 (\$210,700)	43 (\$66,700)	30 (\$23,300)	26 (\$18,075)	48 (\$42,875)	35 (\$72,547)	28 (\$10,508)	11 (\$5,350)
Investigations Closed	1,627	489	506	460	357	590	334	165
Investigations Pending		61	48	80	112	115	91	131

FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS

Warnings	0	0	0	14	4	3	2	2
Letters of Correction	12	11	11	6	4	0	2	0
Non Enforcement Actions	5	2	3	3	15	1	2	1
Civil Penalties (Amount)	0	0	0	0	0	2 (\$25,000)	0	0
Investigations Closed	17	13	14	23	23	6	6	3
Investigations Pending		2	12	15	5	2	4	7

AIRPORTS

Warnings Issued	266	137	168	80	83	63	59	20
Letters of Correction	259	53	65	53	91	14	21	6
Non Enforcement Actions	50	23	20	12	23	19	9	13
Civil Penalties (Amount)	50 (\$32,600)	12 (\$3,500)	11 (\$7,500)	19 (\$15,150)	13 (\$15,600)	23 (\$21,675)	8 (\$ 6,300)	2 (\$750)
Investigations Closed	625	225	264	164	210	119	97	41
Investigations Pending		23	29	69	48	25	18	16

INDIVIDUALS

Administrative Corrections	28	81	68	617	1,469	2,168	2,267	1,269
Non Enforcement Actions	43	24	18	87	162	209	161	108
Civil Penalties (Amount)	2 (\$375)	4 (\$2,050)	9 (\$1,925)	70 (\$11,300)	155 (\$27,210)	231 (\$49,410)	114 (\$28,095)	83 (\$21,295)
Investigations Closed	73	109	95	774	1,786	2,608	2,542	1,460
Investigations Pending		14	45	392	475	398	483	651

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